Both books recount the compelling story of Ashraf Marwan, the Egyptian at the top level of Anwar Sadat’s regime who spied for the Mossad.
Spies, it is said, are attracted to espionage for one of four reasons: Sex, money, ideology, or ego. For Ashraf Marwan, Nasser’s ambitious son-in-law, it was mostly about ego and the interesting if unusual reason that, after Egypt’s catastrophic loss in 1967, he wanted to be on the winning side.
The ambitious Marwan chafed under the restrictions Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt’s President from 1956-1970. Marwan worked in the Office of the President’s Secretary, a sinecure where Nasser could keep an eye on him. To free himself from this oppressive and disapproving supervision, Marwan pursued an advanced degree in London, only to be recalled to Egypt when his father-in-law discovered he accumulated gambling debts, paid off by friends. Nasser despised corruption and insisted Marwan repay the loan and continue his studies from Cairo, flying to London when required to take examinations. It was at this point, motivated by lack of appreciation at home and the need for off-the-books cash, that Marwan called the Israeli embassy.
The Mossad did not follow up, but Marwan called again in late 1970. By this time Nasser was dead and Anwar Sadat was in power. Marwan rose with Sadat, becoming his aide and envoy, one of the most highly placed and most trusted men in the president’s government. As Nasser’s son in law, Marwan provided Sadat with a patina of continuity, and because Nasser had not trusted him, Marwan did not have an independent power base to threaten the new president. There is evidence to suggest Marwan provided Sadat with Nasser’s files on the political elite, ensuring Sadat’s control and Marwan’s usefulness.
From the very beginning, Marwan provided platinum grade intelligence to the Mossad, including the Egyptian order of battle, detailed military plans for the next war, and political perspectives. He informed the Israelis what the Egyptians needed before going to war, and his information formed the basis of the Israeli konceptziya, “The Concept.” Marwan continued to give Israel up-to-date information and contacted the Mossad on October 4, 1973 to give them warning of imminent attack (the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War).
Marwan continued to provide intelligence after the war, although the need for his services waned after Egypt and Israel signed a peace treaty in 1979. Information about Israel’s “top-level spy” began to leak in the 1990’s, and he was explicitly named by Ahron Bregman in an article in Haaretz (one of Israel’s top newspapers) in 1998. A public dispute over the leaks between Eli Zeira, the former head of Israel’s Military Intelligence and Zvi Zamir, the former Chief of Mossad, found its way into court and resulted in public confirmation of Marwan’s identity. Within weeks of publication of the court decision, Marwan was dead, the result of a fall from his London balcony.
Ahron Bregman writes The Spy Who Fell to Earth as a historian and investigative journalist. Bregman was first to disclose Marwan as a high-level spy based on his own research. Marwan contacted him after Bregman’s article appeared in Haaretz, and the two maintained an unusual relationship based on a series of telephone conversations over the course of several years.
Uri Bar-Joseph worked in Israeli Military Intelligence in the 1990’s. During his service, he researched the Intelligence breakdown that resulted in Israel’s poor preparedness when Egypt and Syria attacked on Yom Kippur.
The question has been raised, mostly in oblique fashion by Israel’s former Chief of Military Intelligence, as to whether Ashraf Marwan was a double agent. Bregman discusses some of the reasons why the question was raised, but Bar-Joseph is more thorough, explaining the extent and quality of Marwan’s information, the fact that Egyptian Intelligence lacked the sophistication to run a double agent (few nations do so successfully), the unlikelihood that someone with Marwan’s family connections would be used as a double agent, and more. He provides evidence and plausible explanations for why Marwan, who informed Israel only the day before, and gave them the incorrect time, might not have known precise timing of the outbreak of war.
Bar-Joseph discusses the Israeli konceptziya at length: Marwan’s intelligence informed it, Marwan provided updated information, but individuals in Israeli Military Intelligence firmly adhered to “The Concept” long after its sell-by date. (Bar-Joseph wrote a book about the Arabs’ surprise attack on Yom Kippur and the Israeli intelligence failures that should have prevented the surprise, called The Watchman Fell Asleep.)
Both books relate Marwan’s suspicious death. Bregman was involved because he was to meet with Marwan the day of his death. He felt a degree of responsibility for endangering Marwan by publicly naming him as the spy. Ultimately, both authors believe suicide was unlikely; again, Bar-Joseph’s account is more complete, and he offers more analysis of various theories and motivations of the different parties involved.
Bregman’s book is a quick read and provides a personal perspective. He discusses how he became involved and made contact with Marwan. Bar-Joseph’s book is more complete. For those who are interested in military history or intelligence, The Angel is certainly the go-to book. The Spy Who Fell to Earth may be sufficient for those seeking a broader view, or as a supplement.